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Financial crisis has connected Europe with an obvious common pattern which 
consists the rapidly rise of protest parties that challenge the established political 
systems. The basic and new feature of these schemes is the intense war rhetoric 
against the European Union and the vehement rejection of the selected modes of euro 
rescue. 
 
In this sense, populism appears as a new specter haunting European democracies, as 
active risk, causing serious concerns. Unfortunately, the growing concern does not 
coincide with policies aiming at finding viable solutions, as the center-right parties 
and governments believe that the only solution to the crisis is to adopt austerity 
measures and Social Democrats have not yet found effective alternatives. 
 
This essay will attempt to shed light on some aspects of current populism 
phenomenon with particular focus on its modern manifestations. Firstly, it is useful to 
attempt a classification of the concept of populism. According to Frank Deckeri 
populism is a strong stand against the status quo, it appeals to lower social groups and 
it is a phenomenon of social crises of modernization in the sense that there is a 
systemic review in nearly every form of economic, cultural and political development, 
using simplified shapes and models of analysis. 
 
In other words, a key feature of populism is the manichean method of addressing the 
problems and history at a black and white way of thinking. According to that method, 
diversity, complexity, relativism, uncertainty, doubt, pluralism, rational arguments 
and rationality should not exist. The speech is sharp and violent, devastating, blatant 
and addressed to the collective “we”. In particular, stereotypes and views of 
traditional roles are used in order to achieve the maximum impact on a significant part 
of population which feel insecure. According to Decker, populism and modernization 
are nearly the same thing. 
 
A different approach was introduced by Ernesto Laclau identifying “the dichotomy of 
the social field between privileged and underprivileged as a key feature of populism 
either from the left or the right of the political spectrum”ii. Populists call the 
disadvantaged for enlisting even outside the boundaries of institutional normality and 
claim their support in order to subvert the existing political system. In the concept of  
“people”, according to this logic, only the non-privileged section of the society which 
bears the “ultimate virtue” and is not liable for any misfortune, is included. The 
enemy - friend figure, as once introduced by Carl Schmitt, revives a strange bipolar 
composition. On the one hand is the nation, the people, the underprivileged, our own, 
and on the other, the enemies of the nation, emigres, foreigners, the privileged, the 
moneylenders. 
 
The complexed dipole is followed by a strong willingness of institutional 
obsolescence, which ultimately legitimizes lawlessness behaviors. According to 
Laclauiii populism historically tends to prevail “when a large number of social and 
economic demands accumulates, which can not be satisfied within the existing 
institutional system”. Because populism is always addressed to the disadvantaged, any 
political program aimed at empowering marginalized social groups contains a certain 
extent of populism. Furthermore, Laclau believes that “in every political system, two 
standard political processes exist. In the first, which is defined as populist, there is a 
widespread mobilization of masses based on the ‘equivalence logic’. In the second, 
which is defined as institutional, individual demands of specific social groups are 
dominant, which are implemented selectively by policy practicioners, based on a logic 
of difference”. In every political system, these two processes coexist, but in different 
proportions. According to Laclau the first example was expressed in Greece during 
the widespread redistribution period of Andreas Papandreou (during the 1980s) while 
the second during the modernization period of Costas Simitis (1996-2004). The first is 
a populist and the second is an institutional pole but the predominance of one of them 
do not necessarily eliminate the other. 
 
We could also refer to Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasseriv who distinguish 
three interdependent features of populism. These are primitivism (a weakened form of 
nationalism), autarchy and popular sovereignty. Right wing populists often invoke the 
overthrow of popular sovereignty in order to accentuate the catalytic effect of 
migration while at the same concept, leftist populists emphasize on the dissolution of 
the national state because of the memorandum (imposed by the International 
Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission). 
 
In fact, both cultivate a myth, as stated by Michael Ignattieff. According to him 
“sovereignty is a political concept which means just to be the master of your house. 
The tragedy of modern state sovereignty is that currently, there is not any country in 
the world that is absolutely sovereign in this sense. All societies, all sovereign states, 
face the ultimate rise of globalization and the political importance of the global 
economic crisis is to be realized how vulnerable are all states, as market forces can 
destroy the legitimacy of national political systems without exception”v. 
 
Populism appears in democratic regimes and grow through the existence of a strong 
denunciation of the implementing policies. In most occassions solutions proposed by 
the parties that develop populist speech are inapplicable but they are presented as the 
only alternative, particularly in the impasse posed by the economic crisis. As 
Margaret Canovanvi proposes “populism in modern democratic societies can be 
described as an invocation to the ‘people’ versus the existing power structure and the 
prevailing attitudes and values of society”.  
 
It is obvious that the factors that favor the emergence of populists in Greece have 
found fertile ground during the last four years due to the economic downturn. 
Economic disparities that continually expand the decadent political system and 
frustration for the traditional political forces about their ability to implement effective 
policies that will offer real solutions to the problems plaguing the middle and lower 
social groups, cause the rise of populism and political extremismvii. 
 
 
The increase in poverty and inequality rates is the factor that influence the populist 
political discourse, leading to the rise of the percentages of left and right populist 
parties such as “Golden Dawn” and SYRIZA (Radical Left Party). Their political 
discourse aims at passing to people the reliance that they are the only solution that can 
change the difficult economic situation and even more, by using arguments (Golden 
Dawn) such as that of migration (expulsion of immigrants as a solution to several 
problems) they are trying to attrack votes.  
 
For modern populists, a key supranational issue of political mobilization is European 
integration as an absolute perpetrator of abstract globalization. In this crucial matter, 
amazing coincidences between left and right tend to appear. In Greece, for example, 
left and right populist approaches suggest the return to drachma despite the fact that 
its current value is only 0.00293 Euros. Anti-European left parties such as  
“Drachma” of Theodoros Katsanevas and “Plan B” of Alekos Alavanos have already 
been established together with the neo-Nazist “Golden Dawn”, which record rising 
pecentages in recent polls, and inclusive right wing “Independent Greeks”, which try 
to collect votes from all poles of the political spectrum purely by using policy 
attractiveness through populist political discourse. Specifically, Golden Dawn has 
realised that nazist views are not popular and uses “Hellenophile” as a favorable 
public propaganda. 
 
There are also some constituents of SYRIZA such as “Internationalist Labor Left”, 
which propose that the Greek government should not pay any more the local and 
international loaners, the banks should be nationalized under public-democratic-labor 
control and heavy taxation to businesses and to higher income groups should be 
imposed. Furthermore, it proposes “insubordination on European Guidelines, decisive 
escalation of social unrest, systematic cultivation of relations with the Left and 
resistance movements throughout Europe, seeking the way for the overthrow of 
capitalism on a national and European scale”viii. Slightly softer is “Communist 
Organization of Greece” which supports that the country should exit the Eurozone. 
SYRIZA generally prevails a strange upheaval and uncertainty around the European 
approach. The ostensible commitment of its leadership in the European vision is 
accompanied by views like “the euro is not fetish”, while on the other hand, the 
internal opposition of the left constituent calls for the creation of a left government 
together with the Greek Communist Party (K.K.E.) and “Anti-capitalist Left 
Cooperation for Overthrow” which do not agree with the creation of an institutionally 
unified Europe under capitalist conditions. It is clearly observed, that a contrast 
between the populist and institutional policy template as pointed out by Laclau appear 
in SYRIZA as it existed in PASOK (Panhellenic Socialistic Movement) during the 
mid ‘70s and ‘80s.  
 
The anti-Europeanism is gradually spreading throughout Europe as it demonstrated by 
U.S. research institute Pew Research Center. The percentage of Europeans who have 
a positive view of the Eeuropean Union is now at a record low of 45%. The research, 
which was conducted in eight countries, including Greece, also shows that economic 
crisis is now systemic and made a serious blow to the credibility of the European 
Union. As stated in the report “The European Union is the new sick man of Europe”, 
the effort, during the last half century, to create a more unified Europe is now the 
main victim of the euro crisisix. 
 
Beyond the democratic deficit and the lack of political representation that has brought 
serious problems to the image of the European Union, an even stronger negative 
opinion increases as a result of the endless economic crisis in Europe. Despite the fact 
that a large part of the european population is opposed to the applied budget cuts in 
order to balance the deficits and to tight monetary policy in fear of hyperinflation, it 
has not the ability to change it. Unfortunately, there is a lack of the necessary 
democratic and civic toolsx. 
 
Thus, a developmental shift in countercyclical policy against longer - generalized - 
recession and rising unemployment will take more time in order to be implemented. 
This fact is immediately perceived by individuals who know that any choice in 
european elections will not change Eurozone’s macroeconomic policies and the 
existing political management of the crisis because the European Parliament, as the 
only EU institution that has direct popular legitimacy, has not even the slightest power 
to modify or challenge the imlementing austerity measures. The effect of current 
implementing policies, which reject a clear social majority both in the South and the 
North of the EU, is the rise of euroscepticism even in countries that traditionally were 
considered as too pro-EU, such as Greece. Due to the pervasive dissatisfaction 
because of austerity measures, the political correlations in the new composition of the 
European Parliament are expected to change. It is estimated that the number of anti-
europeans and eurosceptics will increase from 100 to around 200 MEPs in a total of 
751 seats. There is a threat that the changing composition of the European Parliament 
with reinforced radical parties, will reduce the number of European Social Democrats 
and People's Party MEPs below the psychological threshold of 400 seatsxi. 
 
The anti-EU parties both in Greece and in other European countries already record 
very fast growth. The anti-european “UKIP” (United Kingdom Independence Party)  
in United Kingdom has become a a big problem for British Prime Minister David 
Cameron. In Finland the party of “Finns” and in Austria the party “Stronach” record 
significant increase in their percentages. In particular, the latter warns for the decline 
of Europe and as a solution it proposes the introduction of national euros for each 
country with German as a euro currency guide. 
 
On the other side, there is the example of the left Social Democrat Oskar Lafontaine, 
who proposes, for the exit from the European crisis, the return to the European 
Monetary System (EMS), ie the return to national currencies and their coupling. His 
proposals have caused much debate related to the left populism. Other left movements 
emerge with the promise to radically consolidate the existing political system such as 
the Italian party of Beppe Grillo “Five Star”, which had signifcant electoral success in 
previous Italian elections. On the other side, right populist parties emerge such as AfD 
(Alternative for Germany)xii which requests an orderly breakup of the euro, arguing 
that Germany needs the euro, while other countries - especially in the South - harmed 
by this. Also this party requires the return to national currencies or create smaller and 
more stable monetary unions and considers that the reintroduction of mark should no 
longer be a taboo. This view is not the mainstream right-wing populist view in 
Europe. For example, the “Austrian Freedom Party” (FPÖ), which since 1986 
relentlessly attacks the Austrian Republic, is not seeking a return to the Austrian 
currency. Instead, it requires the removal of heavily indebted southern countries from 
the euro, whatever negative effects this option can have. According to the FPÖ, the 
rising unemployment in southern Europe is the direct result of the refusal of the 
eurocrats to reject unsuitable countries from the euro. 
 
Despite the differences in populist right-wing arguments with the objections of 
Lafontaine there is a common reference point in the sense that an explicit and rigorous 
opposition to the direction of national government and the European Union is 
formulated. Lafontaine is explicitly against German associations of businessmen and 
industrialists and cooperates with the neoliberal bloc party consisting of CDU / CSU, 
SPD, FDP and Greens. The “Alternative for Germany” (AfD) believes that the old 
parties are “eroded and fossilized” because they refuse to “admit mistakes and 
omissions and indulge in corrections”. For the “Austrian Freedom Party”, responsible 
for the crisis are the “eurocrats of Brussels”, along with the incompetent Austrian 
politicians. Frontal statements and acute rhetorical confrontation operate as an appeal 
to the people to stop supporting the current government schemes and make another 
political option out of the range of incumbent management solutions. This would 
mean a shift to the left, or alternatively, to the populist right as expressed by AfD or 
the FPÖ. This kind of populism is an effective political “ploy” to irrigate votes at least 
to the extent that large sections of the population accept similar narratives. 
 
Populists are however required to pay a price for this kind of mobilization. The price 
is that they are necessarily apply to a more or less unified national collectivity. 
Lafontaine for example repeats phrases that bring to focus the “Germans” as a 
national entity with specific interests, while AfD admits forthrightly that “Euro is no 
necessary for Germany”. The FPÖ requests “Austria to be the first choice”. Populists 
argue that they are able to better represent the collectivity than the existing 
governments. Peoples’ “will” and the political “will” of populists are identical. 
Accordingly, they usually use the phrase: “we are here for you”.  
 
Therefore, populism works as an ideology which is subject to a quasi-schizophrenic 
perception of equality with the romantic notion of “homogeneous people”. 
“Homogeneous people” is not only against the “capital of foreign imperialist 
interests” of “foreign agents” of “Merkelists”, but overall, against the emigre, foreign 
and unknown. This is essentially a stand against equality and subsequently, against 
progress. In its modern trend, populism is characterized by a national logic embedded 
in a Western European identity. This is a reason why European right-wing parties that 
are members of the European Parliament are in closely collaboration. It is obvious 
that there is no single collective “will” of the people as modern democracies are 
characterized by plurality and diversity which attempt to be organized, especially on 
the side of the left, but not collectivized. 
 
Additional features of populist movements are: the presence of a charismatic leader, 
the use of special techniques of propaganda (conspiracy theories, viewing images of 
the enemy, the preference for radical solutions, challenges and lacerations to taboo). 
Even if we accept the left populism as a necessary form of demagoguery, mobilization 
and stimulation of the masses, at a time when media play an important role in public 
discourse, we can not overlook the fact that the populist discourse is a vigorous and 
active line of “exclusion”. This acts as a systematic appeal to the category of “we”. 
“We” the Greeks, “we” the Austrians “we” the French, that we have common 
interests, opinions and culture.  
 
Populist narratives produce and form imagined communities that usually are against a 
foreign rival. This raises the question whether it is worthwhile for any left to pay the 
price to sacrifice the “foreigners”, the “new” and finally, the totality of the world and 
of difference, for the sake of left populist mobilization. 
 
However, populism has some positive effects such as the increased pressures on the 
established parties to find solutions to key problems and channeling emotions and 
defuse discontent in safe political fields. The potential danger of populist movements 
is that they affect gradually as a poison the official political discourse making it trivial 
and legitimizing anti-ploural trends. The best way to deal with populism is to deprive 
the ground for protest through solving problems, which requires tolerance and not 
one-way views as that of austerity imposed by the Troika in Greece. If someone 
expects positive results from the current Greek political elite, including opposition, 
then we can only wish patience. 
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